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ABSTRACT 
A host state’s pursuance of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
goals may lead to a violation of international investment law (IIL). This 
tension results from the imbalance between international economic 
regulation and social regulation of foreign investments. The paper 
explores the tension between IIL and CSR, analyses the recent practice of 
reconciling the tension through incorporating CSR provisions into 
investment treaties, and proposes to solve the tension through a more 
balanced interpretation of substantive obligations in international 
investment arbitration.  
The host state’s regulation of foreign investments to promote their 
social and environmental responsibilities may violate IIL in three aspects: 
First, the host state may violate the non-discrimination principle by 
differentiating between foreign investments having different social and 
environmental impacts. Second, the host state may violate the Fair and 
Equitable Treatment (FET) standard if the regulation on CSR issues has 
frustrated foreign corporations’ legitimate expectations at the time of 
investment. Third, the regulation in pursuit of CSR taken by the host state 
may constitute indirect expropriation if the measure has substantially 
deprived the value of foreign investments. As a response to these tensions, 
recent years have seen a new approach taken by Canada, Brazil and the 
EU of incorporating CSR provisions to investment treaties. Nonetheless, 
the effectiveness of these CSR provisions is questionable, as a result of the 
traditional role of foreign investors as third-party beneficiaries in 
investment treaties, the  ‘soft law’ nature of CSR norms, and the unclear 
definition of CSR in these provisions.  
In conclusion, the paper proposes to harmonise the host state’s 
pursuance of CSR goals and IIL obligations by making a balanced 
interpretation of international investment obligations: First, in the 
discrimination assessment, the tribunal should take account of non-
economic factors of foreign investments in the determination of whether 
two investors suffering different treatments are ‘in like circumstances’, and 
should allow differentiation between investors to be justified by a 
legitimate CSR policy. Second, in the FET examination, the tribunal 
should strike a balance between the stability requirement under the FET 
standard and the evolving nature of the host state’s regulation on CSR 
issues. Third, in the expropriation analysis, the tribunal should take 
account of the host state’s sovereign right to regulate CSR in the 
assessment of whether a CSR measure constitutes indirect expropriation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The growth of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the past century 
has prompted international regulation of MNEs in two dimensions. In the 
economic dimension, MNEs are leading drivers of foreign direct 
investments (FDI) which can stimulate economic developments in both 
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home and host states.1 Considering FDI as an economic motivational 
force, and maintaining awareness of the political risk faced by foreign 
investors in overseas investments, the international community has 
constructed the international investment law (IIL) regime to protect 
foreign investments.2 Today, this regime consists of 3304 international 
investment agreements (IIAs), including 2946 bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) and 358 treaties with investment provisions.3 These investment 
treaties contain substantive provisions that oblige host states to provide 
foreign investors non-discriminatory treatment, fair and equitable 
treatment, and adequate compensation in case of expropriation. They also 
include an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism (ISDS) that allows 
foreign investors to bring claims against host states before international 
arbitral tribunals.  
The social dimension of MNE regulation is a different story. The 
increasing global recognition of the role of MNEs in the protection of the 
social welfare of the host state, including labour rights, human rights, 
environmental protection and anti-corruption, has lent impetus to a 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement.4 Unlike IIL, which 
restrains the host state’s intervention in the activities of foreign investors, 
the CSR movement promotes the regulation of the private sector to 
protect social and environmental interests. Such regulation on CSR issues, 
in a broad sense, consists of two kinds of rules: On the one hand, a series 
of soft initiatives have been drafted in the international and national levels 
to encourage businesses to take voluntary actions above legal requirements 
for societal goods.5 On the other hand, states have enacted hard rules 
enforcing social and environmental responsibilities of corporations 
                                                            
1 R. Doak Bishop, James Crawford, and William Michael Reisman, Foreign Investment 
Disputes: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Kluwer Law International 2005) 7. 
2 José E. Alvarez, The public international law regime governing international investment 
(Brill 2011) 13-30. 
3 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2016, Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges (2016) 101 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2016_en.pdf> accessed 27 March 2017. 
4 Alice De Jonge, Transnational Corporations and International Law: Accountability in the Global 
Business Environment (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 1-2. 
5 In the international realm, a series of international standards for corporate responsibility 
have been developed, including Global Reporting Initiative, UN Global Compact, ILO 
Tripartite Declaration, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ISO Standards 
and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. In the national realm, 
recent years have seen the evolution of CSR from a voluntary business-led concept to a 
public policy that calls for governmental regulation. See, e.g. Federal Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs, CSR Made in Germany (2012) 8 <http://download. 
diplo.de/New_Delhi/csr-made-in-germany.pdf> accessed 27 March 2017; Atle Midttun, 
et al. ‘Public Policies for Corporate Social Responsibility in Four Nordic Countries: 
Harmony of Goals and Conflict of Means’ (2015) 54.4 Business & Society 464, 473-480. 
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through domestic legislation and administration.6 These hard rules on CSR 
issues have been in tension with states’ international investment 
obligations as a result of their adverse impacts on foreign investments, 
while the soft CSR initiatives, in the recent years, have been incorporated 
into investment treaties to reconcile this tension.  
This paper explores the tension between CSR and IIL, and examines 
the approaches to reconcile this tension. Part 2 of the paper addresses the 
evolution of the tension between the CSR movement and IIL. Part 3 
illustrates three specific tensions between the host state’s regulation on 
CSR issues and their international investment obligations, including non-
discrimination, fair and equitable treatment and no expropriation without 
adequate compensation. Part 4 analyses the recent practice taken by 
Canada, Brazil and the EU to incorporate soft CSR standards to 
investment treaties, and examines whether this new approach is effective 
to reconcile the aforementioned tension between IIL and CSR regulation 
by the host states. Part 5 concludes that a better balance between investor 
protection and investor responsibilities should be struck in international 
investment arbitration.  
2. INVESTOR PROTECTION VS. INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITIES: 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE TENSION BETWEEN IIL AND 
CSR  
Prior to WWII, both the international investment regime and the 
notion of social responsibilities of corporations were at early stages and 
had little interaction with each other. The substantive obligations 
employed by bilateral and multilateral investment treaties in the 
contemporary world originate from the legal terms in bilateral treaties of 
‘Friendship, Commerce and Navigation’ (FCN) concluded in the Colonial 
Era.7 The FCN treaties oblige one Party to provide ‘special protection’ or 
‘full and perfect protection’ to the property of nationals of the other Party 
in its territories and oblige the Parties to provide national treatment and 
most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment and to pay compensation in case 
of expropriation.8  
These substantive obligations in the FCN treaties were drafted to 
serve the policy of protection of overseas investments, with no attention 
paid to the social benefits of the host countries. Although the awareness 
of corporate’s responsibilities to society can date back to the longstanding 
                                                            
6 The narrow view of CSR as purely voluntary norms has been criticized by some 
commentators for its misunderstanding of the relationship between CSR and law. See, 
e.g. Jennifer A. Zerk, ‘Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility: Limitations 
and Opportunities in International Law’ (Vol. 48, CUP 2006) 29-42. 
7 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of international investment law (2nd edn, 
OUP 2012) 6. 
8 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ 
(2005) 12 UC Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 157, 159. 
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debate about the relationship between business and society since the 
Industrial Revolution in 1800s, the notion of CSR was in the 
‘philanthropic’ era, in which companies viewed their social contributions 
more as donations to charities than anything else.9 Moreover, the 
corporate responsibility at that time was viewed as a domestic issue within 
certain civilised countries and had not yet risen to a global problem.10  
The boom of foreign investments after the Second World War called 
for global regulation in two dimensions: in the economic dimension, there 
was a demand, especially by developed countries, for a stronger 
mechanism at the international level to protect these investments. From 
the 1950s to the 1970s, European countries, pioneered by Germany, began 
to conclude bilateral investment treaties to protect overseas investments.11 
This practice was joined by the US in the 1970s and by China in the 
1980s.12 Moreover, the creation of the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanism, in 1965 marked a major innovation in investment protection. 
In the social dimension, the development of foreign investments had 
brought global awareness of the significant social impacts of 
multinationals in host states, especially in developing countries. In 
response, a series of international instruments were drawn up to provide 
global codes of conduct for MNEs, such as the United Nations Draft 
Code for Transnational Corporations,13 the Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (ILO 
Tripartite Declaration), 14 and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
                                                            
9 Archie B. Carroll, ‘A History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and 
Practices’ in Andrew Crane (ed) The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (OUP 
2008) 21. Rhys Jenkins, ‘Globalization, corporate social responsibility and poverty’ (2005) 
81.3 International affairs 525, 526. 
10 For the early development of CSR notion in the UK and the US, see Jenkins (n 9) and 
Carroll (n 9) 21-24. 
11 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 7) 6-7. Vandevelde (n 8) 169-70. 
12 Ibid. 
13 From 1974 to 1990, the United Nations drafted a series of codes to regulate the 
behaviour of transnational corporations. The last draft in 1990 stressed the need for 
foreign investors to obey the law of the host state, to follow the host state’s economic 
policies and to refrain from interfering in the host state’s domestic political affairs. 
However, the draft codes were never adopted. Draft United Nations Code of Conduct 
for Transnational Corporations, UN Doc. E/1990/94 (1990). See also De Jonge (n 4) 
29. 
14 In 1977, the International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted the Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy. The 
ILO Tripartite Declaration, as a voluntary and non-binding instrument, provides 
standards for employment, training, conditions of work and life, and industrial relations. 
International Labour Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy (1977) 17 ILM 422 (1978). The ILO Tripartite Declaration was 
revised in 2000, 2002, 2006 and 2017.  
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Enterprises (OECD Guidelines).15 Compared with investment treaties, 
these international instruments are of a voluntary nature and lack effective 
enforcement mechanisms.  
A fierce confrontation between investment protection and the 
regulation of investors' social responsibilities took place during the 
negotiation for the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in the 
1990s. The draft MAI, negotiated under the auspices of the OECD, was 
crafted as an investment protection and promotion agreement based on 
earlier models of investment protection standards.16 The NGO 
community had criticised the one-sided nature of the draft MAI due to its 
inclusion of only provisions on investor protection, without any regulation 
of the investor’s social responsibilities.17  Upon the extensive campaign by 
NGOs, some general provisions on labour and environmental standards 
were incorporated into the preamble of the draft MAI, and some quid pro 
quo clauses, including an additional labour and environment clause and a 
‘no lowering of standards’ clause, were proposed during the drafting 
processes.18 Although the negotiations of the MAI broke down in 1998 
and the draft was never adopted, the success of including environment 
and labour issues into the draft has contributed to future reconciliation 
between investor protection and investor regulation under the 
international investment regime.19  
Since the 1990s, the tension between investment protection and the 
enhancement of investors’ social responsibilities has increased as a result 
of the proliferation of investment arbitration cases in which foreign 
investors have claimed their investment treaty rights against the host 
state’s regulation in the fields of human rights and environmental 
protection.20 The international investment regime has been criticised for 
                                                            
15 In 1976, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
adopted its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The Guidelines covered a variety 
of enterprise activities, including general policies of operation, disclosure of information, 
competition, financing, taxation, employment, industrial relations, science and 
technology. However, like the ILO Tripartite Declaration, the Guidelines were ‘voluntary 
and not legally enforceable’. OECD, ‘OECD Guidelines for Multilateral Enterprises’ 
(1976) 12-17 <www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/50024800.pdf> accessed 27 March 2017. 
The most recent version of the Guidelines was adopted in 2011 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en> accessed 27 March 2017. 
16 Peter T. Muchlinski, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: 
Where Now?’ [2000] The International Lawyer 1033, 1038.  
17 Peter Muchlinski, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ in Peter Muchlinski, Federico 
Ortino, and Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law 
(OUP 2008) 642, 642. 
18 Muchlinski (n 16) 1048. 
19 Muchlinski (n 17).  
20 From 1995 to 2004, the number of claims registered in ICSID was four times that of 
the previous 30 years. By the end of 2016, there have been 696 publicly known investor-
state arbitration claims, which involve 107 countries as respondents. Gus Van Harten 
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its ‘chilling effect’ on the host state’s right to regulate foreign investments 
for public interests.21 Meanwhile, the rapid development of international 
CSR standards has contributed to the reform of investment treaties.22 In 
recent years, several countries and regions, including Brazil, Canada and 
the EU, have incorporated CSR standards and guidelines into their newly 
concluded investment agreements. The following sections will first analyse 
the tension between host states’ obligations under investment treaties and 
their rights to regulate foreign investors’ social responsibilities, and will 
then examine whether the recent practice of incorporating CSR provisions 
into investment treaties is effective to reconcile this tension.  
3. THE RIGHT TO REGULATE CSR AND INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT OBLIGATIONS 
States have sovereign rights to protect society and the environment 
in its territories from harm by foreign investors.23 Nonetheless, their 
regulation on the social and environmental responsibilities of foreign 
investors may conflict with their substantive obligations under investment 
treaties, including the non-discrimination principle, the fair and equitable 
treatment standard and the compensation requirement for expropriation 
of foreign investments.  
3.1. NON-DISCRIMINATION 
Discrimination is a negative formulation of the principle of equality 
of treatment in international law, which entails like persons in similar 
circumstances being treated differently without justifiable grounds.24 The 
                                                            
and Martin Loughlin, ‘Investment treaty arbitration as a species of global administrative 
law’ (2006) 17.1 EJIL 121, 124. UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report 2016, Investor 
Nationality: Policy Challenges’ (2016) 104.  
21 Jorge E. Viñuales, Foreign investment and the environment in international law (Vol. 94, CUP 
2012) 2; Nicolas Hachez and Jan Wouters, ‘International Investment Dispute Settlement 
in the Twenty-first Century: Does the Preservation of the Public Interest Require an 
Alternative to the arbitral model?’ in Freya Baetens (ed), Investment Law Within International 
Law: Integrationist Perspectives (CUP 2013) 417. Burke-White, William W. and Andreas Von 
Staden, ‘Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-
State Arbitrations’ (2010) 35 YALE J INTL L. 283; Van Harten and Loughlin (n 20).  
22 Since 1990s, new soft international instruments have been made to balance business 
protection against their responsibilities to the social welfare of the host states. See, e.g., 
the 2000 UN Global Compact, the 2006 UN Principles for Responsible Investment, and 
the 2011 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.  
23 Suzanne A. Spears, ‘The Quest for Policy Space in A New Generation of International 
Investment Agreements’ (2010) 13.4 Journal of International Economic Law 1037, 1038. 
24 Plama Consortium Ltd v Republic of Bulgaria [2008] ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award 
[184]; AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘Expropriation of Alien Property and the Principle of Non-
Discrimination in International Law of Foreign Investment: An Overview’ (1998) 8 J. 
Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 69, 69.  
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non-discrimination principle in IIL prohibits a host state from 
unreasonable differentiation between foreign investors and other similar 
investors. In investment treaties, non-discrimination is mainly reflected in 
two provisions: the national treatment (NT) provision and the most-
favoured nation treatment (MFN) provision,25 which employ very similar 
language, except that MFN prevents discriminatory treatment between 
foreign investors of different nationalities,26 while NT prohibits 
discrimination between foreign investors and domestic investors.27 
Investment tribunals conducting discrimination assessment need to 
first determine whether the investors being treated differently are ‘in like 
circumstances’. Many investment tribunals held that two investors are 
comparable under the non-discrimination clause if they are in a 
competitive relationship, i.e., in the ‘same business or economic sector’.28 
However, states' regulation on CSR issues usually uses a different basis of 
comparison. For example, it is not uncommon that states' regulation in 
social and environmental realms may distinguish between different groups 
of enterprises based on their size and activities. In 2014, the European 
Parliament and the Council adopted the Directive on disclosure of non-
financial and diversity information relating to CSR issues by large 
companies and groups.29 The directive only applies to large enterprises 
                                                            
25 Christopher Dugan, et al., Investor-state Arbitration (OUP 2011) 397. Federico Ortino, 
‘Non-Discriminatory Treatment in Investment Disputes’ in PM Dupuy, F Francioni and 
EU Petersmann (eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (OUP 
2009) 346. 
26 The MFN clause provides that a foreign investor and its investment should not be 
treated less favourably compared with the investor or investment in like circumstances 
from any third country. For example, Article 1103 of the NAFTA provides: ‘Each Party 
shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favourable than that it 
accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any other Party or of a non-Party with 
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, 
and sale or other disposition of investments.’ North American Free Trade Agreement 
1994 [hereinafter NAFTA], art 1103(1). 
27 The NT clause requires that the host state accord a foreign investor and its investments 
no less favourable treatment than that accorded to its own investor and investments in 
like circumstances. For instance, Article 1102 of the NAFTA provides: ‘Each Party shall 
accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in 
like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments.’ NAFTA, art 1102(1). 
28 S.D. Myers, Inc. v Government of Canada [2000] UNCITRAL, Partial Award [248], [250]; 
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v Government of Canada [2001] UNCITRAL, Award on the Merits of 
Phase 2 [78]; Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v United Mexican States [2002] ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/1, Award [171]; Champion Trading Company, Ameritrade International, Inc. v 
Arab Republic of Egypt [2006] ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9, Award [130]. 
29 Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 22 October 
2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and 
diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups [2014] OJ L 330/1. 
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with more than 500 employees, leaving small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) untouched.30 Another common basis of distinction is 
the activities conducted by enterprises. For instance, highly polluting 
industries, such as chemical, oil refining and steel industries may face a 
heavier burden of environmental protection than other less-polluting 
industries.  
Since sizes and activities of enterprises are not a basis of comparison 
in the discrimination assessment under IIL, a foreign investor may claim 
that the host state’s measure involving such distinction constitutes 
discrimination because of its different treatments of investors in the same 
business or economic sector. A large foreign enterprise, for example, may 
claim that the aforementioned EU Directive is discriminatory, since it has 
been treated differently from those SMEs in the same business sector. In 
Parkerings v. Lithuania, the host state’s regulation for the protection of 
cultural heritage was claimed by the foreign investor as a violation of the 
non-discrimination clause, since the regulation had differentiated between 
investors based on their sizes. In this case, Lithuania rejected the foreign 
investor’s construction project but permitted another similar project 
because of the former’s proximity to a culturally and environmentally 
sensitive Old Town. The foreign investor argued that Lithuania had 
violated the non-discrimination clause by differentiating between two 
investors in like circumstances. Fortunately, this claim was correctly 
refused by the tribunal. The tribunal noted that although the two projects 
had shown obvious similarities, except for their different sizes,31 the 
potential negative impact of the foreign investor’s project in the old town 
was increased by its considerable size and by its proximity to the old town, 
and as a result, the foreign investor’s project ‘was not similar with’ the 
other comparator.32 
Other than the tribunals adopting the ‘same business or economic 
sector’ approach, a small number of tribunals held that investors in 
different business or economic sectors are also comparable.33 This broad 
interpretation of likeness makes it possible for foreign investors to claim 
that the host state’s social or environmental regulation, which makes a 
distinction between different business sectors, is discriminatory. In Arcelor, 
several steel producers claimed before the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) that the European Emissions Trading Directive (established to fulfil 
the commitments under Kyoto Protocol) and the French implementing 
measures violated the equal treatment standard, because the emission 
trading system was applied to the steel sector, but not to the chemical and 
                                                            
30 Ibid. 
31 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania [2007] ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, 
Award [381]. 
32 Ibid [392]. 
33 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador [2004] LCIA Case 
No. UN3467, Final Award [173]. 
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aluminium sectors, which also produce large emissions of greenhouse 
gases. The court examined whether the three sectors were in comparable 
situations. Noting that the purpose of the Directive was to reduce 
greenhouse gases emissions, the court held that ‘the different sources of 
greenhouse gas emissions relating to economic activities are in principle 
in a comparable situation, since all emissions of greenhouse gases are liable 
to contribute to dangerous interference with the climate system and all 
sectors of the economy which emit such gases can contribute to the 
functioning of the allowance trading scheme’.34 The court also based its 
conclusion on the text of the Directive, stating that ‘policies and measures 
should be implemented across all sectors of the economy of the Union’.35 
With respect to the respondent’s argument that these three sectors were 
not in a competitive relationship, the court objected that, as regards the 
comparability of the three sectors, ‘the possible existence of competition 
between those sectors cannot constitute a decisive criterion’.36 For this 
reason, the court found these sectors to be comparable under the equal 
treatment clause.37  
A more balanced interpretation of ‘in like circumstances’ can be 
achieved by taking account of not only the business sector of the 
investments, but also other non-economic factors, such as the 
investment’s social and environmental impacts in the likeness assessment. 
The Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area 
has been a pioneer in this respect. Article 17(2) of this treaty provides that 
the references to ‘like circumstances’ in the National Treatment clause 
‘requires an overall examination on a case by case basis of all the 
circumstances of an investment including’ ‘its effects on third persons and 
the local community’ and ‘its effects on the local, regional or national 
environment, including the cumulative effects of all investments within a 
jurisdiction on the environment’.38 This interpretation of ‘like 
circumstances’ will provide guidance for future tribunals assessing the 
national treatment clause to balance the foreign investor’s right against the 
host state’s right to protect public interests affected by the foreign 
investor’s activities. 
                                                            
34 Socie ́te ́ Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others v Premier ministre and Others [2008] Case 
C­127/07, Judgment [34]. 
35 Ibid [35]. 
36 Ibid [36]. 
37 However, the ECJ finally held that the EU Emissions Trading Directive did not violate 
the equal treatment clause, because it was a novel and complex scheme whose 
implementation could have been disturbed by involving too many participants, and 
therefore, involving only steel sector as the first step was within the discretion of the 
Community legislature. Ibid [60]-[61]. 
38 Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area, art 17(2) 
<www.tralac.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/12/files/2011/uploads/Investment_ 
agreement_for_the_CCIA.pdf > accessed 1 May 2017. 
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Another way to achieve such balance is by treating legitimate social 
or environmental protection objectives as justifiable grounds for 
discriminatory treatment of foreign investors. However, although almost 
all the tribunals have acknowledged that a host state’s discriminatory 
treatment against foreign investors can be justified if such treatment is 
based on a rational public policy, there is no clear-cut answer among the 
tribunals with respect to what constitutes a ‘rational’ policy and how the 
challenged measure should be designed to achieve that policy.  
In the cases so far decided by investment tribunals, rational public 
policies have been interpreted broadly, encompassing a wide range of 
governmental objectives, including economic development,39 
environmental protection40 and cultural policies.41 Therefore, it is 
doubtless that CSR goals should be seen as a ‘rational’ policy by 
investment tribunals. However, the existence of rational policy by itself 
does not justify a differentiation. Some tribunals have required a 
reasonable relationship between the rational public policy and the 
challenged governmental measure. For example, the Pope & Talbot Award 
required that the difference in treatment must be in a ‘reasonable nexus’ 
with a rational public policy.42 The Parkerings tribunal adopted a similar 
approach, noting that ‘a less favourable treatment is acceptable if a State’s 
legitimate objective justifies such different treatment in relation to the 
specificity of the investment.’43  
Other tribunals have examined whether the different treatment 
against the foreign investor was necessary to achieve the relative public 
goals.44 A typical example was S.D. Myers v. Canada, which concerned a 
Canadian ban on the export of a hazardous chemical, polychlorinated 
biphenyl (PCB). The claimant, a US company exporting PCB from Canada 
to the US, alleged that it had been discriminated against compared with 
domestic investors, because the business of the US investor inevitably 
involved exporting PCB materials to the US, which was not the case for 
the domestic investors. This discrimination, argued by the claimant, was a 
violation of Article 1102 (national treatment) of the NAFTA. In this case, 
the tribunal upheld the respondent’s legitimate objective of ensuring the 
economic strength of the domestic industry. But merely having a 
legitimate objective, in the view of the tribunal, could not of itself justify 
the differentiation.45 Since there were two alternative measures that could 
have achieved the same objective without infringing the investor’s right, 
                                                            
39 Gami Investments, Inc. v. The Government of the United Mexican States (2004), UNCITRAL, 
Final Award [114]. S.D. Myers (n 28) [255]; Pope & Talbot (n 28) [87]. 
40 Marion Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica [2012] ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1, Award 
[264]; Parkerings (n 31) [392] and [396]. 
41 Parkerings (n 31) [396]. 
42 Pope & Talbot (n 28) [79]. 
43 Parkerings  (n 31) [371]. 
44 S.D. Myers (n 28) [215]; Arcelor (n 34) [47]. 
45 S.D. Myers (n 28) [255]. 
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the tribunal concluded that the measure taken by the respondent was not 
justifiable.46  
These different approaches adopted by tribunals in the ‘justification’ 
analysis make it uncertain whether the discriminatory treatments of 
foreign investors can be justified by a purpose of promoting CSR goals. It 
would be relatively easy to justify a discriminatory measure in pursuit of 
CSR if the tribunal adopts a ‘rational nexus’ approach. On the other hand, 
if the tribunal adopts a necessity test, the host state needs to prove that 
the discriminatory treatment was ‘necessary’ to achieve the CSR policies.  
3.2. FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT 
The Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) standard has been a key 
component in a majority of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties, 
and has been the most frequently invoked standard in investment 
arbitration.47 Although the FET clauses have diverse language, most of 
them require host states to accord foreign investors and their investments 
‘fair and equitable treatment’, without a further illustration of what is ‘fair’ 
and ‘equitable’.48 For instance, Article 10 of the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT) provides that: 
‘Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of 
this Treaty, encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and 
transparent conditions for Investors of other Contracting Parties to make 
Investments in its Area. Such conditions shall include a commitment to accord at 
all times to Investments of Investors of other Contracting Parties fair and equitable 
treatment …’49  
One main function of the FET standard is to ensure the stability of 
the investment environment in the host state. Before making an 
investment, a prudent foreign investor will conduct a careful investigation 
of the host state’s investment environment, including an examination of 
the host state’s legal framework as well as any undertakings made by the 
host state, in order to have a general expectation of the potential success 
of an investment and, accordingly, to decide whether and how to make an 
investment. Stability of the host state’s investment environment is a key 
issue here.50 If, after the establishment of the foreign investment, the host 
                                                            
46 Ibid.  
47 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 7) 130. 
48 A small number of investment treaties refer the FET standard to the minimum 
standard of treatment (MST) in customary international law. See, e.g., the US Model BIT 
2012, Article 5; the China-Korean FTA 2015, Article 12.5. However, a reference to MST 
does little help to anchor the meaning of FET, since the meaning of MST itself is unclear. 
W. Michael Reisman, ‘Canute Confronts the Tide: States versus Tribunals and the 
Evolution of the Minimum Standard in Customary International Law’ (2015) 30.3 ICSID 
Review 616. 
49 The Energy Charter Treaty 1994, Article 10 (emphasis added). 
50 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes (Kluwer Law 
International 2000) 25-60.  
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state changes its law (e.g. by enacting new legislation or revoking the 
investor’s operating licenses) or breaches its assurances (e.g. by violating 
specific representations made by governmental officials to the foreign 
investor),  it would frustrate the investor’s initial expectations with respect 
to the planning of its investment. To ensure the predictability and stability 
of the host state’s legal framework, the tribunals have interpreted the FET 
standard such that a host state’s conduct that frustrates the foreign 
investor’s legitimate expectations at the time of investments will lead to a 
violation of the FET standard in IIL.51 As the tribunal in Biwater Gauff v. 
Tanzania stated: 
‘[T]he purpose of the fair and equitable treatment standard is to 
provide to international investments treatment that does not affect the 
basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to 
make the investment, as long as these expectations are reasonable and 
legitimate and have been relied upon by the investor to make the 
investment’.52  
The FET standard is in tension with the host state’s right to regulate 
social responsibilities of foreign investors, since this sovereign right is 
subject to an obligation of not infringing the foreign investor’s legitimate 
and reasonable expectations at the time of investments. In investment 
arbitration, this tension has often been seen in cases involving the host 
state’s regulation of the environmental responsibilities of foreign investors 
due to the rapidly evolving environmental law as a result of the growing 
scale of pollution and ecological degradation, increasing environmental 
consciousness and scientific development. 53 
First, the host state may frustrate the foreign investor’s expectations 
by enacting new legislation on investors’ environmental obligations. 
Glamis Gold v. US is an illustrative example. Glamis was a Canadian 
company that mined gold on federal land in southeastern California. Its 
open pit mining project was located in a culturally sensitive area where 
there existed designated Native American sites. To protect cultural sites, 
the U.S. federal government denied the project based on the ‘undue 
impairment’ standard that was newly enacted in a solicitor’s M-Opinion. 
This was, however, claimed by the foreign investor as a frustration of its 
legitimate expectations, which were based on the preexisting mining law 
that adopts a less strict ‘unnecessary or undue degradation’ standard. The 
investor’s argument was supported by the tribunal, which held that the 
shift in standards ‘represented a significant change from settled practice 
                                                            
51 CMS v Argentina [2005] 14 ICSID Reports 158, Award [274]; LG&E v Argentina [2007] 
21 ICSID Review-FILJ 203, Decision on Liability [125]; Unglaube (n 40) [248]. Duke 
Energy v Ecuador [2008] ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award [337]-[340]. 
52 Biwater v Tanzania [2008] ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award [602]. 
53 Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnee and Ellen Hey, The Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law (OUP 2007) 30. Daniel Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International 
Environmental Law (Harvard University Press 2010) 19. 
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and, arguably, surprised Claimant.’54 Despite this, the tribunal finally held 
that the adoption of the novel standard by the US government did not 
violate the FET clause, since the M-Opinion did not occasion ‘a gross 
denial of justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack 
of due process, evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons.’55 
Second, the host state might frustrate the foreign investor’s 
expectations by enacting ‘novel’ environmental regulation. The term 
‘novel’ means that the environmental regulation is in contrast with the 
assurances made by the host state upon which the foreign investor has 
based its expectations. Such assurances may come from the existing law 
of the host state. For example, in Bilcon v. Canada, the tribunal held that 
Canada’s usage of a novel concept of ‘community core values’ in the 
environmental impact assessment had frustrated the foreign investor’s 
legitimate expectations and constituted a violation of the FET clause.56 In 
this case, the U.S. investors constructed and operated a mining quarry and 
marine terminal project located in Nova Scotia, Canada. This project, 
however, was denied by a Canadian review panel in the environmental 
assessment, because of the project’s potential harm to the ‘community 
core values’, which, the panel held, could not be remedied by any 
mitigation measure. The investors claimed that the term ‘community core 
values’ was a novel concept that had not been mentioned in any existing 
environmental legislation. The tribunal, upholding that investor’s position, 
held that the novel usage of the concept of ‘community core values’ 
frustrated the investors’ reliance on the Canadian government’s previous 
encouragement of the investment.57 The tribunal concluded that this 
‘distinct, unprecedented and unexpected’ approach taken by the Canadian 
review panel in the environmental assessment had violated the FET 
standard.58  
The environmental regulation by the host state may also frustrate the 
foreign investor’s expectations if it contradicts the assurances that have 
previously been made by the host state’s officials to the foreign investors. 
In Metalclad v. Mexico, the US investor Metalclad invested in a hazardous 
waste landfill in Mexico. After having received both federal and state 
permits to construct and operate the landfill, and having been assured by 
federal officials that it had all authority necessary to undertake the project, 
Metalclad started its construction, which, however, was later halted by the 
municipal government for environmental reasons. In this case, the 
tribunal protected the foreign investor’s expectations based on the 
representations made by the host state’s federal officials, holding that a 
denial of a construction permit by the Mexican municipal government had 
                                                            
54 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v US [2009] UNCITRAL, Award [759]. 
55 Ibid [762]. 
56 Bilcon v Canada [2015] UNCITRAL PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award [589]-[591]. 
57 Ibid [589]. 
58 Ibid [601]. 
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violated the FET standard since the federal officials had promised the 
foreign investor that the investor had received all the permits needed to 
start construction.59   
The aforementioned cases have shown the circumstances in which 
the host state’s efforts to promote environmental responsibilities of 
foreign investors, either through legislation or administration, may 
constitute a violation of the FET standard in IIL. In all these cases, a key 
goal is striking a balance between the stability requirement under the FET 
standard and the dynamic environmental regulation by the host state. On 
the one hand, the host state should ensure a certain degree of stability of 
its legal framework to protect foreign investments in its territories; on the 
other hand, the stability requirement must not be interpreted as an 
absolute standard, and the host state should enjoy sovereign right to adjust 
domestic environmental regulation to evolving social needs.60 An 
appropriate balancing point seems to be that, under the FET standard, the 
host state can change its environmental regulation as long as this change 
is made in due process and does not result in a discriminatory effect on 
foreign investments.  
3.3. INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION 
Expropriation, as the most severe form of infringement on property 
rights, has been a central concern in IIL.61 Modern investment treaties do 
not prohibit the host state from expropriating foreign investments in its 
territory, but require that the expropriation must be conducted in a legal 
method, that is (1) for a public purpose, (2) not arbitrary or discriminatory, 
(3) in due process, and (4) accompanied by prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation. Expropriation can be categorised into direct and indirect 
expropriation. Direct expropriation occurs when the governmental 
measure leads to transfer of ownership of property from investors to 
states or third parties.62 Today, direct expropriation has been very rare, 
since a drastic and open taking of foreign property will jeopardise host 
                                                            
59 Metalclad v Mexico [2000] 5 ICSID Reports 212, Award [88]-[89]. 
60 The tribunal in Saluka v. Czech Republlic held in this respect: ‘No investor may reasonably 
expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is made remain totally 
unchanged. In order to determine whether frustration of the foreign investor’s 
expectations was justified and reasonable, the host State’s legitimate right subsequently 
to regulate domestic matters in the public interest must be taken into consideration as 
well. (…) The determination of a breach of [the FET clause] by the Czech Republic 
therefore requires a weighing of the Claimant’s legitimate and reasonable expectations on 
the one hand and the Respondent’s legitimate regulatory interests on the other.’ Saluka v 
Czech Republic [2006] 15 ICSID Reports 274, Partial Award [305]-[306]. 
61 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 7) 98. 
62 Catherine Yannaca-Small, ‘“Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in 
International Investment Law’ 3 (OECD Working Paper, No. 2004/4, 2004) 
<www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/33776546.pdf> 
accessed 27 March 2017. 
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states’ reputation in attracting foreign investments.63 Alternatively, states 
tend to conduct indirect expropriation, which can be defined as any 
governmental measure that substantially impairs the value of the 
investment without affecting the ownership.64 For instance, in Goetz v. 
Burundi, the tribunal held that Burundi’s revocation of a free-zone status 
granted to the foreign investor had forced the investor ‘to halt all activities’ 
and had constituted a ‘measure having similar effect’ to expropriation.65 In 
CME v. Czech Republic, the tribunal held that the host state’s interference 
with the contract rights of the foreign investor’s subsidiary, which had 
destroyed the commercial value of the investments, had amounted to an 
indirect expropriation.66 
Although the concept of indirect expropriation has been 
incorporated into many multilateral and bilateral investment agreements,67 
it is difficult to differentiate between indirect expropriations, in which the 
host states have to pay compensation to aggrieved investors, and the 
legitimate right of host states to regulate their internal affairs.68 In this 
context, an important question is: if the host state’s enforcement of the 
social responsibilities of the foreign investor has substantially deprived the 
foreign investor from utilising its investments, does the host state’s 
regulation constitute an indirect expropriation so that an adequate 
compensation should be paid, or is it within the host state’s right to 
regulate so that no compensation is needed? Investment jurisprudence on 
this question has been inconsistent.   
Some tribunals have adopted the ‘sole effects doctrine’, which 
means, to determine whether a governmental measure constitutes an 
indirect expropriation, one should examine only the effects of the measure 
on the property allegedly expropriated, with no consideration of the 
                                                            
63 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 7) 101. 
64 W. Michael Reisman and Robert D. Sloane, ‘Indirect Exproprion and Its Valuation in 
the BIT Generation’ (2004) 74.1 British Yearbook of International Law, 115; Yannaca-
Small (n 62) 3-4; Anne K. Hoffman, ‘Indirect Expropriation’ in August Reinisch (ed) 
Standards of Investment Protection (OUP 2008) 151. 
65 Goetz v Burundi [1999] 6 ICSID Reports 5, Award [124]. 
66 CME v. Czech Republic [2001] 9 ICSID Reports 121, Partial Award [591]. 
67 For instance, Article 1110 of the NAFTA stipulates that ‘[n]o party may directly or 
indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment … or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation’ (emphasis added); Article 13 of the ECT reads 
‘[i]nvestments of investors … shall not be  nationalised, expropriated or subjected to a 
measure or measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation’ (emphasis added); 
Article 6 of the 2012 United States Model BIT also provides that ‘[n]either Party may 
expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly through measures 
equivalent to expropriation or nationalization.’ (emphasis added) 
68 Markus Perkams, ‘The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law-
Searching for Light in the Dark’, in Stephan W. Schill (ed) International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law (OUP 2010) 107-8; Generation Ukraine, Inc. v Ukraine Award [2003] 
ICSID Case No.ARB/00/9 Award  [20.29]; Saluka (n 60) [263]. 
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objective underlying the measure.69 Under this approach, even if a measure 
is adopted for enforcing social responsibilities of corporations, it will result 
in compensation by the host state in circumstances that the measure has 
substantially deprived the investors from utilising their investments. As 
stated by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in the Phelps Dodge case, 
‘the Tribunal understands the financial, economic and social concerns that 
inspired the law pursuant to which [Iran] acted, but those reasons and 
concerns cannot relieve the Respondent of the obligation to compensate 
Phelps Dodge for its loss.’70 In SPP v. Egypt, the Egyptian government 
withdrew an approval of a foreign tourist project to protect nearby cultural 
heritage. The tribunal found that the withdrawal of approval had 
amounted to indirect expropriation, and Egypt should pay fair 
compensation to the foreign investor even though ‘antiquities are 
involved’.71 In Metalclad v. Mexico, the tribunal held that an Ecological 
Decree issued by Mexico to prohibit the operation of a foreign hazardous 
waste facility had constituted indirect expropriation, and that the tribunal 
‘need not decide or consider the motivation or intent of the adoption of 
the Ecological Decree.’72  
Contrary to the sole effects doctrine, the ‘police powers doctrine’ 
provides that regulatory conducts within the police powers of the state do 
not constitute indirect expropriation as long as they are in good faith and 
non-discriminatory. In S.D. Myers v. Canada, the tribunal rejected the 
investor’s claim that the Canadian ban on the export of PCB, a hazardous 
material, constituted indirect expropriation. The tribunal held that 
‘[r]egulatory conduct by public authorities is unlikely to be the subject of 
legitimate complaint under Article 1110 of NAFTA, although the tribunal 
does not rule out that possibility.’73 The tribunal also stated that both the 
purpose and the effect of the export ban had to be considered to 
determine indirect expropriation.74  
The Methanex v. US case concerned a ban on the use or sale of the 
gasoline additive MTBE in California, US. The foreign investor argued 
that the ban had expropriated parts of its investments. The tribunal 
rejected this claim, holding that a governmental regulation does not 
constitute indirect expropriation if it is: 1) for public purpose, 2) non-
discriminatory, 3) enacted in due process and, 4) without specific contrary 
commitments given by the government to the investors.75  
                                                            
69 Valentina Vadi, Public health in international investment law and arbitration (Routledge, 2012) 
137. 
70 Phelps Dodge, 10 Iran-US CTR 130 [22]. 
71 SPP  v  Egypt [1992] 3 ICSID Reports 189 Award [159]. 
72 Metalclad (n 59) [109]-[111]. 
73 S.D. Myers (n 28) [281]. 
74 Ibid. 
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The same approach was adopted in the subsequent Chemtura v. 
Canada case.76 In this case, the Canadian government cancelled the 
registrations of the US investor’s products that involved the use of lindane, 
a hazardous insecticide. The US investor claimed that the Canadian 
government’s act was tantamount to expropriation under Article 1110 of 
NAFTA. However, the tribunal held that the Canadian government ‘took 
measures within its mandate, in a non-discriminatory manner, motivated 
by the increasing awareness of the dangers presented by lindane for human 
health and the environment. A measure adopted under such circumstances 
is a valid exercise of the State's police powers and, as a result, does not 
constitute an expropriation.’77 
The third category of tribunals, citing the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights, have tended to adopt a proportionality 
test to strike a balance between investment interests and the host state’s 
right to regulate public interests. In LG&G v. Argentina, the tribunal held 
that ‘[w]ith respect to the power of the State to adopt its policies, it can 
generally be said that the State has the right to adopt measures having a 
social or general welfare purpose. In such a case, the measure must be 
accepted without any imposition of liability, except in cases where the 
State’s action is obviously disproportionate to the need being addressed.’78  
This proportionality test has been adopted by the Azurix v. Argentina 
tribunal concerning Argentina’s water regulation. In this case, the US 
investor Azurix was granted an exclusive right to operate the water and 
sewage systems in the Argentinian Province of Buenos Aires based on a 
30-year concession. However, several months after the commencement of 
the operation, there was an incident of algae outbreak that resulted in the 
contamination of local water. Blaming Azurix for this incident, the 
Argentinian government encouraged consumers to refuse to pay their 
water bills and eventually terminated the concession. Azurix argued that 
Argentina’s conduct was tantamount to expropriation under the 
Argentina-US BIT, while Argentina insisted that its regulatory actions 
were for public purpose and did not amount to expropriation. The tribunal 
examining the claim correctly recognised the necessity to distinguish non-
compensable regulatory actions from compensable indirect expropriation. 
The tribunal noted: ‘In the exercise of their public policy function, 
governments take all sorts of measures that may affect the economic value 
of investments without such measures giving rise to a need to 
compensate.’79 This approach is in contrast to the ‘sole effects doctrine’ 
which refuses to take account of the intent of the host state in the 
assessment of indirect expropriation. On the other hand, the Azurix 
tribunal also disagreed with the police powers doctrine that generally 
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77 Ibid [266]. 
78 LG&E (n 51) [195]. 
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excludes all bona fide regulation from an obligation to compensate. 
Adopting a third method, the tribunal sought guidance in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, especially by 
reference to the James and others v. UK case, holding that ‘a measure 
depriving a person of his property [must] pursue, on the facts as well as in 
principle, a legitimate aim “in the public interest”’, and must also bear ‘a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed 
and the aim sought to be realized’.80  
Among the three doctrines, the sole effects doctrine is often 
criticised for its restriction on state’s right to regulate.81 This doctrine 
ignores social and environmental goals underlying the measure, obscures 
the boundary between indirect expropriation and legitimate regulations, 
and has ‘chilling effects’ on the host state’s efforts to regulate public 
interests. Compared with the sole effects doctrine, the police powers 
doctrine saves the regulatory space of host states, ensuring that a legitimate 
measure for public objectives does not lead to compensable indirect 
expropriation. The proportionality doctrine also takes due regard for the 
state’s right to regulate, and strikes a balance between the investors’ 
interests and the host state’s interests by requiring the act of the host state 
to be proportional to achieve public policies.  
4. THE OBLIGATIONS TO REGULATE CSR? INCORPORATING 
CSR STANDARDS INTO INVESTMENT TREATIES 
4.1. BALANCING INVESTOR RIGHTS AND SOCIAL INTERESTS IN 
INVESTMENT TREATIES  
Although most investment treaties do not explicitly recognise the 
right or duty of host states to regulate for policy objectives other than 
investment protection and promotion,82 recently a growing number of 
investment treaties have included social and environmental protection 
provisions to balance the foreign investor’s rights against the public 
interests of the host state. Some investment treaties pursue this balance by 
indicating non-economic objectives such as public health, environmental 
protection and labour rights in the preamble of the treaty.83 These social 
                                                            
80 Ibid [311]. 
81 See, e.g., Rahim Moloo and Justin Jacinto, ‘Environmental and Health Regulation: 
Assessing Liability under Investment Treaties’ (2011) 29 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 1, 63; J. 
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82 Spears (n 23) 1045. 
83 One example is the 2012 US Model BIT, the preamble of which states the Parties’ 
desire to achieve the economic and investment objectives ‘in a manner consistent with 
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and environmental objectives in preambles serve as guidance for the 
interpretation of treaty provisions by investment tribunals,84 though they 
could not provide a practical method for balancing the competing interests 
of foreign investors and the public.  
Some treaties have gone a step further by adopting the ‘no lowering 
of standards’ provision, which, responding to the ‘polluter haven’ 
hypothesis, prevents states from lowering its environmental or labour 
standards as an inducement to foreign investments.85 For example, Article 
1114(2) of the NAFTA stipulates that it is ‘inappropriate to encourage 
investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental 
measures’.86 However, this ‘no lowering of standards’ provision is in non-
binding ‘best efforts’ language and is not linked up to the dispute 
settlement mechanism.87  
As a third approach, some investment treaties incorporate exception 
clauses that exclude the host state’s acts in pursuit of certain public 
objectives from violating substantive investment obligations. One type of 
such exception clause is modelled on Article XX of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Article XIV of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). However, different from the 
WTO law, there has been no coherent style of general exceptions clause 
in investment treaties.88 The threshold for justifying non-conforming state 
measures under legitimate public objectives varies among different 
treaties: some treaties require the host state’s non-conforming measures 
to be ‘necessary’89 or ‘proportional’90 to achieve public objectives, while 
others have a less strict requirement that the measure should be 
‘appropriate’91 for the relevant objectives.  
Another kind of exceptions clause applies in particular to the IIL’s 
prohibition on performance requirements. For example, the NAFTA 
prohibits the host state from imposing performance requirements on 
                                                            
internationally recognized labor rights’. The 2012 US Model BIT, preamble 
<www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf> accessed 1 May 2017. 
84 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [1969] 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, art 
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85 Muchlinski (n 17) 671. Mary E. Footer, ‘Bits and Pieces: Social and Environmental 
Protection in the Regulation of Foreign Investment’ (2009) 18 Mich. St. U. Coll. LJ Int'l 
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87 Muchlinski (n 17) 671-2. Footer (n 85) 43. 
88 For a detailed analysis of different types of general exceptions clauses in investment 
treaties, see Spears (n 23) 1060-2. 
89 The 2004 Canadian Foreign Investment Protection Agreement (FIPA), art 10 
<www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf> accessed 1 May 
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90 The 2007 Colombian Model BIT, art VIII <www.italaw.com/documents 
/inv_model_bit_colombia.pdf> accessed 1 May 2017. 
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foreign investors, except that the measures are ‘necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health’ or ‘necessary for the conservation 
of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources’, provided that they 
are not applied arbitrarily or unjustifiably, and that they ‘do not constitute 
a disguised restriction on international trade or investment’.92  
The above-mentioned approaches for reconciling investor and social 
interests have one thing in common: they balance competing interests by 
protecting the right of states to regulate (through the exceptions clause) 
social or environmental issues or by imposing obligations on states to 
regulate (through ‘no lowering of standards’ provision) such issues, but 
they do not impose direct obligations on foreign investors themselves to 
respect social responsibilities.93 Unlike these approaches, recent years have 
seen a new approach of incorporating CSR standards into investment 
treaties.  
4.2. INCORPORATING CSR STANDARDS INTO INVESTMENT TREATIES 
An early attempt to adopt CSR norms in investment treaties can be 
seen in the 2007 draft Norwegian Model BIT, which includes an article 
stating that ‘[p]arties agree to encourage investors to conduct their 
investment activities in compliance with the OECD Guidelines on 
Multinational Enterprises and to participate in the United Nations Global 
Compact’.94 This provision does not impose direct CSR obligations on 
foreign investors, but uses weak language to indicate the Parties’ 
agreement to ‘encourage’ investors to abide by CSR standards. Recently, a 
notable phenomenon of including CSR provisions into investment 
agreements has been seen in Canadian, Brazilian and EU treaty-making 
practice.  
4.2.1. CANADA  
Canada has incorporated CSR norms into its investment treaties in 
the last few years. The 2013 Benin-Canada BIT, for example, provides that 
the ‘Guiding Principles’ of the obligations of the Contracting Parties 
include ‘national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment, minimum 
standard of treatment, compensation for losses, compensation for 
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93 UNEP, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Regional Trade and Investment 
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94 The 2007 Norwegian Draft Model BIT, art 32 < 
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expropriation, transparency, subrogation and corporate social responsibility’.95 
(emphasis added) Article 16 of this BIT, entitled ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility’, obliges the Parties to encourage enterprises in its territory 
to commit to internationally recognised CSR standards. It provides:  
‘Each Contracting Party should encourage enterprises operating 
within its territory or subject to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate 
internationally recognized standards of corporate social responsibility in 
their practices and internal policies, such as statements of principle that 
have been endorsed or are supported by the Contracting Parties. These 
principles address issues such as labour, the environment, human rights, 
community relations and anti-corruption.’96 
This CSR provision marks a start of incorporating soft ICSR terms 
into hard international investment treaties, despite the fact that the 
provision has a soft character by using the terms ‘encourage’ and 
‘voluntarily’, and that the CSR provision cannot form a basis for a claim 
raised by the foreign investor against the host state in investment 
arbitration.97 Moreover, the provision does not refer to particular 
intentional instruments on ‘internationally recognized standards of 
corporate social responsibility’.  
Most subsequent Canadian investment treaties that adopt CSR 
provisions have employed an almost identical wording as that adopted in 
Article 16 of the 2013 Benin-Canada BIT.98 However, the CSR provision 
of the 2013 Canada-Honduras FTA seems to provide a lower CSR 
requirement than that in other Canadian investment treaties. Different 
from other treaties that require states to encourage enterprises to commit 
to CSR in their ‘practices and internal policies’, the 2013 Canada-
Honduras FTA only requires states to encourage CSR in the enterprises’ 
‘internal policies’.99 On the other hand, the 2014 Canada-Mali BIT and the 
2015 Burkina Faso-Canada BIT provide a relatively stricter CSR obligation 
than that of other treaties. Instead of requiring Parties to encourage 
enterprises to ‘voluntarily incorporate’ internationally recognised CSR 
standards, both BITs delete the word ‘voluntarily’ and oblige Parties to 
encourage enterprises to ‘incorporate’ those standards.100 
A unique wording has also been adopted by Article 16 of the 2014 
Canada-Senegal BIT, which not only obliges states to encourage CSR 
commitments by the enterprises, but also directly encourage such 
                                                            
95 The 2013 Benin-Canada BIT, art 4.  
96 Ibid, art 16. 
97 Ibid, art 23. 
98 The 2014 Cameroon-Canada BIT, art 15; The 2014 Canada-Nigeria BIT, art 16; The 
2014 Canada-Serbia BIT, art 16; The 2014 Canada-Republic of Korea FTA, art 8.16; The 
2014 Canada-Côte d'Ivoire BIT, art 15. 
99 The 2013 Canada-Honduras FTA, Chapter 10, art 10.16.  
100 The 2014 Canada-Mali BIT, art 15(3); The 2015 Burkina Faso-Canada BIT, art 16. 
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enterprises ‘to make investments whose impacts contribute to the 
resolution of social problems and preserve the environment.’101  
Although almost all CSR provisions in Canadian investment treaties 
prohibit the foreign investor from bringing investment arbitration claims 
based on a violation of the CSR provision by the host state,102 one 
exception is the 2015 Burkina Faso-Canada BIT, which does not prohibit 
an arbitration claim formed on the basis of the CSR provision.103 As a 
result, the foreign investor who has incurred damages by reason of a 
violation of the CSR provision by the host state can claim for 
compensation in the investor-state arbitration process under Article 21 of 
the Burkina Faso-Canada BIT. 4.2.2 Brazil 
In 2015, Brazil concluded a series of Agreements on Cooperation 
and Facilitation of Investments (ACFIs) in the context of strong political 
opposition to traditional BITs.104 Different from BITs aimed at 
investment protection, the ACFIs focus on the objectives of investment 
facilitation and risk mitigation. In terms of substantive obligations, the 
Brazilian ACFIs provide only limited standards of treatment for foreign 
investments (including NT and MFN clauses, but excluding FET and 
indirect expropriation clauses). Moreover, the ACFIs replace investor-
state arbitration with two institutions—a Joint Committee and Focal 
Points – to implement the agreement and to settle potential disputes 
mainly through consultation, negotiation and mediation. This novel 
mechanism aims to deter foreign investors from judicially challenging host 
states’ measures.105  
The Brazilian ACFIs are also novel for its inclusion of CSR 
provisions. Different from Canadian BITs, most Brazilian ACFIs impose 
CSR obligations directly on investors rather than on State Parties. For 
instance, in the 2015 Brazil-Angola ACFI, the 2015 Brazil-Mozambique 
ACFI, the 2015 Brazil-Malawi ACFI and the 2015 Brazil-Mexico ACFI, 
the CSR provisions require ‘investors and their investments’ to strive to 
                                                            
101 The 2014 Canada-Senegal BIT, art 16.  
102 The 2014 Cameroon-Canada BIT, art 20; The 2014 Canada-Nigeria BIT, art 21; The 
2014 Canada-Serbia BIT, art 21; The 2014 Canada-Republic of Korea FTA, art 8.18 and 
8.19; The 2014 Canada-Mali BIT, art 20; The 2014 Canada-Côte d'Ivoire BIT, art 20. The 
2013 Canada-Honduras FTA, art 10.19; The 2014 Canada-Senegal BIT, art 21. 
103 The 2015 Burkina Faso-Canada BIT, art 21. 
104 Fabio Morosini and Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badinmorosini, ‘The Brazilian 
Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for 
International Investment Agreements?’ (Investment Treaty News, 4 August 2015) 
<www.iisd.org/itn/2015/08/04/the-brazilian-agreement-on-cooperation-and-
facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-new-formula-for-international-investment-
agreements/> accessed 1 May 2017. Nitish Monebhurrun, ‘Novelty in International 
Investment Law: The Brazilian Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of 
Investments as a Different International Investment Agreement Model’ (2017) 8 Journal 
of International Dispute Settlement 79, 82. 
105 Morosini and Badinmorosini (n 104). 
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achieve the highest possible level of contribution to the sustainable 
development of the host state and the local community.106 However, a 
different approach can be seen in the 2015 Brazil-Chile ACFI, in which 
Article 15 imposes CSR obligations on both states and investors: on the 
one hand, State Parties recognise the importance of encouraging investors 
within its jurisdiction to apply social responsibility;107 on the other hand, 
investors should do their best to comply with social responsibilities.108 
Another different approach has been adopted by the 2015 Brazil-
Columbia ACFI, which merely obliges State Parties to ensure that 
undertakings within their territories incorporate the voluntary social 
responsibilities into their business conducts, without a direct obligation 
imposed on investors or investments.109  
The CSR provisions in the Brazilian ACFIs are also innovative for 
the reason that they provide detailed implementation guidelines, covering 
a wide variety of CSR principles, including protecting environment, 
respecting human rights, cooperation with local community, creating 
employment opportunities, facilitating the training of workers, observing 
the legislation on environment, health, safety and labour issues, and 
refraining from discrimination against workers.110 Investors are also 
recommended to bear the supply chain responsibility by encouraging their 
business partners to observe these principles. Despite this wide coverage, 
these ACFIs do not provide any CSR standard on corruption. Instead, 
they either require investors to respect local political processes and 
activities,111 or require investors to refrain from undue interference in local 
political activities.112 This might contribute to a cover-up of corruption 
issues.113 
Although the Brazilian ACFIs have stipulated a wide arrange of CSR 
standards, they have also emphasised the voluntary and non-binding 
nature of these standards. All of these ACFIs stress that the CSR principles 
                                                            
106 The 2015 Brazil-Angola ACFI, art 10; The 2015 Brazil-Mozambique ACFI, art 10; the 
2015 Brazil-Malawi ACFI, art 9; the 2015 Brazil-Mexico ACFI, art 13. 
107 The 2015 Brazil-Chile ACFI, art 15(1). 
108 Ibid, art 15(2). 
109 The 2015 Brazil-Columbia ACFI, art 13. 
110 The 2015 Brazil-Angola ACFI, Annex II; The 2015 Brazil-Mozambique ACFI, Annex 
II; the 2015 Brazil-Malawi ACFI, art 9(2); the 2015 Brazil-Mexico ACFI, art 13(2); the 
2015 Brazil-Columbia ACFI, art 13. 
111 The 2015 Brazil-Angola ACFI, Annex II; The 2015 Brazil-Mozambique ACFI, Annex 
II; the 2015 Brazil-Malawi ACFI, art 9(2); the 2015 Brazil-Mexico ACFI, art 13(2). 
112 The 2015 Brazil-Columbia ACFI, art 13. 
113 Monebhurrun (n 104) 98. However, it is also noteworthy that some Brazilian ACFIs 
have particular anti-corruption clauses, indicating the Parties’ obligations to prevent 
corruption and their rights to refuse protection of investments related to corruption. See 
the 2015 Brazil-Chile ACFI, art 14 and the 2015 Brazil-Colombia ACFI, art 14.  
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are ‘voluntary’ standards.114 Moreover, they all use soft terms, such as 
‘highest possible level’,115 ‘seek to ensure’116 or ‘do their best’117, to define 
the State Parties’ or the investors’ obligations to pursue such voluntary 
standards.  
The soft nature of CSR principles has also been reflected in the 
enforcement mechanism of these CSR provisions. With respect to some 
ACFIs, although the treaties allow state-state arbitration as a dispute 
settlement mechanism, they exclude claims based on the CSR provision 
from arbitration processes. For example, according to Article 23 of the 
Brazil-Columbia ACFI, a claim based on the CSR clause may not be 
submitted to arbitration.118 In other ACFIs, states may not even be 
possible to be subject to a CSR claim in the state-state arbitration, since 
the CSR obligations are imposed on investors rather than on states.119 
Nonetheless, CSR provision may be implemented in a relatively soft way 
through the administration of Joint Committee and National Focal Points.  
4.2.2. THE EU 
In 2011, the European Parliament published a resolution on the 
future European investment policy, in which it calls for a corporate social 
responsibility clause ‘to be included in every FTA the EU signs’.120 
Following this policy, in recent years, the EU has included CSR provisions 
in its newly concluded Association Agreements and Free-Trade 
Agreements (FTAs). Compared with bilateral and multilateral investment 
treaties, these Association Agreements cover a much wider variety of 
topics, including political, economic and social cooperation between the 
Parties, which naturally makes Association Agreements a better platform 
for reconciling investment protection and social interests than other 
investment agreements. In these Association Agreements, CSR provisions 
are usually placed in the chapter on promoting trade/investment 
                                                            
114 Almost all Brazilian ACFIs have expressly stated that the CSR principles are 
‘voluntary’. See the 2015 Brazil-Angola ACFI, art 10; The 2015 Brazil-Mozambique 
ACFI, art 10; the 2015 Brazil-Malawi ACFI, art 9; the 2015 Brazil-Mexico ACFI, art13; 
the 2015 Brazil-Columbia ACFI, art 13.The only exception might be the 2015 Brazil-
Chile ACFI, but in this treaty, the voluntary character of the CSR norms could be inferred 
from the Article’s reference to the OECD Guidelines. See the 2015 Brazil-Chile ACFI, 
art 15(2). 
115 The 2015 Brazil-Angola ACFI, art 10; The 2015 Brazil-Mozambique ACFI, art 10; the 
2015 Brazil-Malawi ACFI, art 9; the 2015 Brazil-Mexico ACFI, art 13. 
116 The 2015 Brazil-Columbia ACFI, art 13. 
117 The 2015 Brazil-Chile ACFI, art 15(2). 
118 The 2015 Brazil-Columbia ACFI, art 23. 
119 The 2015 Brazil-Angola ACFI, art 10; The 2015 Brazil-Mozambique ACFI, art 10; the 
2015 Brazil-Malawi ACFI, art 9; the 2015 Brazil-Mexico ACFI, art 13. 
120 European Parliament Resolution of 6 April 2011 on the Future European 
International Investment Policy (2010/2203(INI)) [2011] 2012/C 296 E/05. 
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favouring sustainable development and in the chapter on ‘cooperation on 
employment, social policy and equal opportunities’.  
The CSR provisions in the EU Association Agreements and FTAs 
impose the obligations to promote CSR at State Parties rather than directly 
at investors, and they all use non-binding language to describe the state’s 
obligation to promote CSR. For example, the 2012 Colombia-EU-Peru 
FTA has a particular Title (Title IX) on Trade and Sustainable 
Development, under which Article 271 provides that the Parties should 
strive to facilitate and promote trade and FDI in environmental goods and 
services, and that ‘[t]he Parties agree to promote best business practices 
related to corporate social responsibility’.121 Similarly, Article 293 of the 
2012 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement provides that the Parties shall 
strive to facilitate and promote trade and FDI in environmentally friendly 
goods, services, technologies and energies, and shall strive to facilitate 
trade in products that contribute to sustainable development, including 
products ‘respecting corporate social responsibility and accountability 
principles’.122 In the 2016 EU-Kazakhstan Enhanced Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement, Article 154 (entitled ‘Trade and investment 
promoting sustainable development’) provides that the Parties agree to 
promote ‘trade and investment in environmental goods and services and 
in climate-friendly products and technologies’ and to promote ‘corporate 
social responsibility practices’.123 
Unlike the above-mentioned agreements that generally mention 
‘corporate social responsibility’, other EU Association Agreements refer 
to specific International Corporate Social Responsibility (ICSR) standards. 
The 2014 EU-Georgia Association Agreement, under the Title of ‘Trade 
and investment promoting sustainable development’, provides that the 
Parties agree to promote CSR, by reference to ‘relevant internationally 
recognised principles and guidelines, especially the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises.’124 The 2014 EU-Moldova Association 
Agreement and the 2012 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement refer to 
several ICSR guidelines, including the OECD Guidelines, the UN Global 
Compact, and the ILO Tripartite Declaration.125  
These treaties have employed different enforcement mechanisms of 
CSR provisions. In some treaties, the CSR provision is implemented in a 
soft and non-binding way. Under the 2012 Colombia-EU-Peru FTA and 
the 2012 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, for instance, the CSR 
                                                            
121 The 2012 Colombia-EU-Peru FTA, art 271(2) and (3). 
122 The 2012 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, art 293(2) and (3). 
123 The 2016 EU-Kazakhstan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, art 
154. 
124 The 2014 EU-Georgia Association Agreement, art 231(e). See also art 352. 
125 The 2014 EU-Moldova Association Agreement, art 367 (e). The 2012 EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement, art 422. 
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provisions cannot be claimed under state-state arbitration,126 though the 
implementation of CSR can be monitored and facilitated in other soft 
ways, including consultations and an examination by a group of experts.127 
On the other hand, the 2014 EU-Georgia Association Agreement and the 
2014 EU-Moldova Association Agreement do not exempt the CSR 
provisions from state-state arbitration.128 As a third case, although a 
dispute regarding the CSR provision could be arbitrated under the 2016 
EU-Kazakhstan Agreement, an arbitration result regarding the CSR 
provision is excluded from the protection provided by the treaty’s 
compliance procedure, including the remedies for non-compliance. 129 
From a comparative perspective, the Canadian, Brazilian and EU 
practice of incorporating CSR provisions into investment agreements 
have similarities and differences. On the one hand, they all acknowledge 
the soft and non-binding nature of CSR obligations and adopt a ‘best 
efforts’ approach to encourage the promotion of CSR. Furthermore, the 
vast majority of investment treaties concluded by these three entities do 
not allow the CSR provisions to be claimed in the investor-state or state-
state arbitration mechanisms. On the other hand, these treaties have 
adopted different approaches with regard to designation of liability. Most 
of the Canadian and EU treaties address the obligation to promote CSR 
to State Parties, while a majority of Brazilian ACFIs directly encourage 
investors and their investments to abide by CSR standards. The contents 
of the CSR obligations in these treaties are also different: The Canadian 
investment treaties generally refer to ‘corporate social responsibility’ in 
their CSR provisions; the Brazilian investment treaties specify several 
ICSR instruments; some of the EU investment treaties generally mention 
corporate social responsibility, while others indicate specific ICSR 
standards.  
4.3. CHALLENGES OF INTERPRETING AND ENFORCING CSR 
PROVISIONS IN INVESTMENT TREATIES 
There have not been any investment cases concerning the 
interpretation of the CSR provisions in these investment treaties. 
                                                            
126 The 2012 Colombia-EU-Peru FTA, art 285(5). The 2012 EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement, art 322.  
127 In both treaties, a Party may seek consultations to another Party with respect to 
sustainable development issues (including CSR), and may, after 90 days of the delivery of 
the consultation request, request that a Group of Experts be convened to examine the 
matter. The Group of Experts, comprised of one national from either Party and a 
chairman from a third country, will produce a non-binding report determining whether 
a Party has fulfilled its obligations on sustainable development. See the 2012 Colombia-
EU-Peru FTA, art 283-5. The 2012 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, art 301. 
128 The 2014 EU-Georgia Association Agreement, Chapter 14. The 2014 EU-Moldova 
Association Agreement, s 3. 
129 The 2016 EU-Kazakhstan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, art 
155 and Chapter 14(3)(2). 
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Although it has been argued that CSR standards can be the quid pro quo for 
the dominating objective of investor protection in investment treaties,130 
there are several challenges concerning the interpretation and enforcement 
of these CSR provisions.   
First, investment agreements are triangular treaties that impose 
obligations on State Parties to protect foreign investors as third-party 
beneficiaries.131 Does the incorporation of CSR provisions into investment 
treaties change the very nature of investment treaties by imposing 
obligations not only on host states, but also on foreign investors?132 How 
should the CSR provisions be interpreted alongside with other substantive 
obligations of host states, and how should the CSR provisions be enforced 
in the singe-direction investor-state arbitration mechanism in which only 
foreign investors can be claimants? As noted above, most Canadian, 
Brazilian and EU investment treaties have excluded CSR provisions from 
being a basis of claim in the arbitration process. Nonetheless, the arbitral 
tribunals may consider CSR provisions as a context when interpreting 
other substantive clauses in investment treaties, such as non-
discrimination, FET and expropriation.  
Second, contrary to investment obligations which have a ‘hard law’ 
character, most CSR standards in international instruments are seen as 
‘soft law’ for their non-binding and voluntary language and the absence of 
an effective enforcement mechanism. What does it mean to incorporate 
these soft CSR norms into hard investment treaties? Should we expect 
these soft norms to act as a restriction to the hard investment obligations, 
or should we treat these norms as a ‘good efforts’ approach due to their 
voluntary nature in other international instruments? According to 
Canadian, Brazilian and EU practice, the CSR provisions in investment 
treaties have explicitly treated CSR as voluntary, and therefore, it seems at 
least by now an exaggeration to consider those CSR provisions as an 
effective method to balance public interests against investors’ rights. 
Third, the tribunals may face difficulties in the interpretation of these 
CSR provisions as a result of the unclear definition of CSR itself. A general 
reference to ‘corporate social responsibility’, as the approach adopted in 
Canadian investment treaties, may create difficulty for future tribunals to 
define CSR.133 As a different approach, the Brazilian ACFIs and some EU 
investment treaties refer to specific ICSR instruments, such as the ILO 
                                                            
130 Muchlinski (n 17) 643. 
131 Anthea Roberts, ‘Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of Investment Treaty 
Rights’ (2015) 56.2 Harv. Int'l L.J. 353, 353. 
132 It seems that Canada and the EU have bypassed this question since they designate the 
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Tripartite Declaration or the OECD Guidelines, which can provide a 
clearer guidance for tribunals to determine the particular CSR standards 
adopted by the Parties.   
5. CONCLUSION 
The tension between IIL and CSR has been reflected in investment 
arbitral cases in which host states’ regulation of social and environmental 
responsibilities of foreign investors, through legally binding legislation and 
administration, has been claimed by foreign investors as a breach of 
international investment obligations. As a response to this tension, recent 
years have seen a new approach, pioneered by Canada, Brazil and the EU, 
of incorporating soft CSR standards into investment treaties. Nonetheless, 
the effectiveness of this new approach is still uncertain, as a result of the 
traditional role of foreign investors as third-party beneficiaries in 
investment treaties, the  ‘soft law’ nature of CSR norms, and the unclear 
definition of CSR in these provisions.  
In such circumstances, international investment tribunals are taking 
the critical responsibility of balancing foreign investor’s right to a fair 
investment environment and the host state’s right to regulate social 
responsibilities of foreign investments. A more balanced interpretation of 
international investment obligations should be struck in investment 
arbitration, by taking account of CSR policies in the assessment of non-
discrimination, FET, and indirect expropriation. First, the tribunal should 
consider non-economic factors in the determination of whether two 
investors are ‘in like circumstances’ in the discrimination assessment, and 
should regard CSR policy as a rational policy that can justify a 
discriminatory treatment if there is a rational relationship between the 
differentiation in question and the CSR policy it pursues. Second, 
investment tribunals should take the dynamic and evolving nature of 
regulation on CSR issues into consideration, and should refrain from 
interpreting the stability requirement of the FET standard in an absolute 
way. Third, the tribunal should take account of the host state’s sovereign 
right to regulate CSR in the assessment of whether the host state’s 
regulation on CSR issues constitutes indirect expropriation that calls for a 
compensation paid by the host state to the foreign investor. 
